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Before setting off, I wish to pay tribute to the person who
held the first chair for sociology in Finland. Inevitably that
person did not study sociology, Uno Harva came from theol-
ogy, collected myths of steppe and forest societies in North-
ern Eurasia, found that their stories about the origin of the
world refer to, among others, trees of life and water spirits,
and admitted that their tales about the end of times are under-
studied. These societies and such ideas no longer charm so-
ciologists. Still, Harva’s findings are pertinent to a venerable
question: what is the content of the origin and destination
stories told in various human societies, and how did these
ideas come about? They were not derived from observa-
tions, since neither the story tellers themselves were present
at the events they recount, nor the persons who told them
the hearsay. Now, one hypothesis says that people do not
always derive ideas from observations, but reason by anal-
ogy, with the far away and unknown being modeled on the
familiar and vitally important. In addition, the world orig-
inated long ago, and lakes, rivers and trees feature in the
survival strategy of fishers and hunters in forests of North-
ern Eurasia, but not in that of peoples there who herd cattle
on dry and treeless grasslands. So, trees of life and water
spirits will be less dominant in folk lore of steppe societies.
I quite like my own theoretical exercise regarding Harva’s
societies and their myths. However, I will not follow it up
here by identifying analogies behind ideas on coming catas-
trophes in contemporary high-tech societies. There are quite
a few possible disasters: the bursting of bubbles blown from
a tower in Frankfurt, floods resulting from fossil fuel over-
doses, mass killings in the name of God, and military clashes
after diplomatic brinkmanship by Putin and Trump. I deal
with the prospects, if any, of sociology in general.
Contemporary sociology is in a sorry state. This is valid
for Finland, where people in Turku decided to celebrate the
launch of sociology in Finland in 1926, by a talk in 2016
on the state of sociology in 2106. That sociology is in a
sorry state, holds for the Netherlands too: Turku seduced
with success a Dutch sociologist to take up the 90+90 topic.
All joking apart, I do think that several phenomena indicate
that present day sociology is in a sorry state, and I will argue
that, as a consequence of the digitalization of everything, so-
ciology’s state in 2106 will be much healthier. I thank the
organizers of this event for asking me to elaborate on +90
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sociology. I hope they do not mind that I bring in -90 sociol-
ogy too. It was quite decent as regards problems and theories,
and +90 sociology will resemble it.
Contemporary sociology’s state:
five flaws
Five phenomena indicate that contemporary sociology is
in a sorry state.
First, for decades now strife about styles of research roils
and soils sociology. Before 1968 the division between ex-
ploratory and confirmatory research held sway, then the op-
position between qualitative and quantitative research gained
ground, and now many a methodologist makes much of the
merits and minuses of case-oriented and variable-oriented
approaches. My take on these quarrels is that as refutations
of conjectures are desirable, every piece of research should
be taken as exploratory. The pertinent distinction is between
researchers who do and do not make much of an effort to
write their thoughts down. The retort that it is impossible to
state all one’s expectations, is a bad excuse for not volunteer-
ing any. In the coming decades the distinction between case-
and variable-oriented approaches will collapse.
Second, the gap between theory and research in present
day sociology is so wide, that it has been called a scandal.
One malefactor is the existence of pure theorists, another
culprit their preoccupation with concepts. Concepts are illus-
trated, while propositions are testable, which creates research
jobs. Logically related propositions are not difficult to draft,
they take shape by staying tuned to puzzling findings. Later
I state how concepts go out, and which multilayered theories
drive sociological research in 2106.
Third, several things are wrong with how contemporary
sociology deals with theories. It is dumbfounding that, al-
though it is known that several theories may be derived from
one and the same more general theory, few such exercises are
undertaken. Treatises tell students about sociology’s sources
in the French Enlightenment and in the Scottish Enlighten-
ment, yet do not compare the fluids that flowed from one
well with the other, and sidestep the German Enlightenment,
as if Durkheim did not reject Kant’s idea that the categories
of human knowledge are a priori, and as if Bourdieu did not
seek to supersede in a Durkheimian way Kant’s thoughts on
beauty. All in all, Students delve so deep into sociology’s
past, that they ignore the deduction of new specific theo-
ries, important for future sociology, from old but general
theories. When it comes to logical relations between con-
temporary theories, the textbook contention that sociology
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embraces multiple, one another complementing, paradigms
misses out on what is wrong with sociology’s theories, since
most approaches around do not comprise the exemplars of
archetypical paradigms. Later on I outline to what extent
in future decades, theory tomes and reviews of sociology’s
history contain a mish mash.
Fourth, present day sociology is in a sorry state as its the-
ories do not link up with its questions. A theory should an-
swer several questions, and proves it mettle when it answers
a novel one. For pure theorists this common sense notion
excuses dealing with any specific question.
A fifth indication of sociology’s sorry state is that there
is something fishy about sociology’s questions themselves.
Leading sociologists admit that sociology cannot be pigeon-
holed by its questions, since they are so diverse. I will hold
that seemingly disparate problems are sub-problems of long-
standing larger problems, and that pure theorists should com-
mand problem structures out of the closet. In 2002 Ruhar
Vilhjamsson and Thorolfur Thorlidsson from Iceland, as ed-
itors of Acta Sociologica, wrote four pages on central issues
in sociology. By 2106 most journals will do so almost every
decade. The first editors to follow in Islandic footsteps will
be the Finns Jani Erola and Suvi Salmenniemi. Later I detail
three overarching problems for sociology.
Seven effects of the digitalisation
of everything
The prime mover in sociology for the next 90 years is the
digitalization of everything, which started in the 1980s. It has
seven effects, and they mostly upgrade sociology’s present
state.
First and second effect: two victories for quantita-
tive research
Digitalization hastens the quantification of long-term soci-
etal trends. For some decades now the universities of, among
others, the Netherlands and the United States have harbored
a sizeable historical sociology, with questions on gradual de-
velopments and all-changing events. Since quantitative data
have piled up for more than a century in 2106, as a first effect
of digitalization, historical sociology will merge into quanti-
tative research.
Second, privacy concerns about individual information
will weaken qualitative research. In addition, strains of qual-
itative research will get re-labelled as quantitative, such as
verbose studies dealing with questions about the year in
which various countries passed a certain piece of social secu-
rity legislation. After all, the difference between these years
for country A and B is a quantitative variable. Quantitative
research will be strengthened strongly by public access to
data files of national and international statistical offices. Data
sets from various non-governmental organizations will do so,
too.
Third effect: quantitative research splitting up into
a lenient and a strict camp
These victories of quantitative research will not bring eter-
nal peace, fierce fighting among number crunchers will be
a third effect of the digitalization of everything. The accu-
racy of non-governmental surveys will be doubted first. The
U.S. Religious Landscape Surveys downplayed findings of
religious decline by dropping longstanding indications of re-
ligiosity, and offering shaky new ones. Disputes about in-
dicator accuracy will be followed by wrangling about data
collection. Some quantitative sociologists use data for per-
sons right now and taken on their own, while other sociol-
ogists go for data on multiple moments, multiple actors and
multiple contexts. A superior answer to, say, the question of
high employment and underclass formation, requires data on
a person’s unemployment history, that of a person’s spouse,
the local labor market, and programs of the regional employ-
ment office. Yet, with BIG MAC data discord still strikes.
Retrospective data on multiple moments cannot be trusted.
But then, drop out plagues panels. This leads to stalemates.
On top of strife about indicator accuracy and the right type
of data, there will be issues about the statistical models to
be estimated for the data and the indicators constructed from
them, with pure methodologists insisting that assumptions
are violated by various kinds of models. Quite often, the
supposedly best kind of model still will be under construc-
tion.
All in all, a strict and a lenient camp arise. The data, indi-
cators, and models of the strict camp are logically superior,
the lenient camp wishes to know to what extent they actually
are so, and no camp tests hypotheses about the direction and
size of systematic errors. In 2106 lenient sociologists at an
international conference call strict campers overzealous po-
licemen.
Fourth and fifth effects: better teaching of theories
and methods
Open access digital libraries with the complete works of
famous foreigners and all comments of all their foes will kill
the format of student papers for classes on sociology’s his-
tory and theories. Browsing and searching books by Ger-
mans who died two centuries ago - remember I am going
on about 2106 - make smooth sailing of papers like “Did
Marianne Schnitger write on rationalization before her hus-
band Max Weber did?”, and “Which concept of habitus did
Bourdieu take from Weber, and which one from Panovsky?”.
This bad apple in the sociology curriculum was noted by a
committee on the quality of teaching programs for sociology
in European universities, which issued a report 2026.
As a remedy, a fourth effect of the digitalization of every-
thing, those teaching courses on sociology’s history and the-
ories began to spread the message that conceptual schemes
are out and multilayered theories are in. Since then students
are instructed, among others, to state the concept of the logic
of the media, as proposed by Manuel Castells, in the form of
a proposition on effects of competition between mass media.
SIMILARITIES AND DIFFERENCES BETWEEN SOCIOLOGY 90 YEARS AGO AND 90 YEARS FROM NOW 21
They also are to summarize The Transformation of Intimacy
by Anthony Giddens into one hypothesis, which specifies
from what to what intimacy transformed, and what exactly
caused it. And from that they are to derive that same-sex
marriages in some European countries were allowed earlier
than in others.
The digitalization everything had, fifth, another and even
bigger impact on sociology courses. In 2031 contrarian nerds
from method sections in sociology departments at various
European universities transformed the indigestible methods
books of their pre-digitalization professors. These geeks,
who earlier on chatted in the box Statistical Stupidities of
Sociology Students, did so with an internet course given tele-
genic lecturers on Advances and Blunders in the History of
Sociological Research. The course and its e-books went vi-
ral, and since these materials gave big shots a close shave,
while also pointing to lesser gods who set things right, the
old mish mash in printed textbooks on sociology’s history
and theories got jettisoned. The premise was that every
new method avoids blunders in sociological research, and the
course and its e-books pinpointed sociologists who commit-
ted them.
I will not detail the blunders highlighted in Advances and
Blunders, but mention that according to the Finnish nerd in
the team, the figures on men with more than one wife, col-
lected by Hilma Granquist from Finland while living in a
Palestinian village for three years in the 1920s, are an under-
estimate. Applying the dictum that women can be studied
only by women, Granquist constructed, with the help of lo-
cal women, trees of descent for the four clans and six other
families in the village of Artas. These trees stretch back to
1830, when people returned after a long absence, having fled
in violent clashes with other villages about women. Of the
199 married men, 26 were polygamous, or 13%. However,
men differ in age and take an additional wife later in life. Ad-
vances presented a statistical model yielding the right higher
estimate. According to a WikiLeak, the Dutch nerd in the
team had smugly noted that Granquist did not compute how
many village women were in polygamous marriages.
Sixth effect: output of case-oriented research as
input for variable-oriented research, and output
of variable-oriented research as input for case-
oriented research
My report on the sixth effect of the digitalization of every-
thing will be long. In the second chapter of Advances and
Blunders, its authors explode the distinction between case-
and variable-oriented approaches by retelling two episodes
from sociology’s history.
The first episode plays in the 19th century, and its open-
ing shot presents Auguste Comte and Adolphe Quetelet. The
Frenchmen Comte had termed the science of human soci-
eties “physique sociale”, but when Quetelet from Belgium
showed in Physique Sociale the yearly stability of figures
on crime, marriage and suicide, Comte thought up as a de-
fense the word “sociology”. Since Quetelet took his numbers
from records kept by governmental offices founded during
Napoleon’s rule, Comte did not see the new research method
right before his eyes.
The second shot for the episode brings in the obscure
Édouard Ducpétiaux and Frédéric Le Play. In 1855 Ducpéti-
aux, a supporter of Quetelet, published revenues and expen-
ditures for 199 Belgian working class families. In the same
year, the French mining engineer Le Play published detailed
evidence on the life of 36 families from various European
countries. He obtained it, while extracting minerals at far-
away places, by lodging with local working class families,
where he feasted his eyes, and pricked up his ears. Each of
Le Play’s case descriptions ends with a list of revenues and
expenses. Sitting down with persons to note receipts and ex-
penditures, was another new method for obtaining evidence.
The comments of Ducpétiaux and Le Play on the budgets
were meager, as if figures speak for themselves.
The final shot for this episode stars Ernst Engel, the direc-
tor of the statistical office for Saxony. He held in 1857 that
Ducpétiaux and Le Play did not carry through the program
of the budget method. Calculating for their 255 budgets the
percent of all revenues spent on food, he found that as income
is higher, the proportion for food is lower. This regularity got
known as Engel’s law, and became part of a theory on human
needs. Advances and Blunders commented that Engel, by
culling findings from case-oriented research to deploy them
in variable-oriented research, undermined the distinction be-
tween case-oriented and variable-oriented approaches.
Advances and Blunders also has a three-shots episode in
the history of sociological research from the late 20th cen-
tury. You may know it, but it bears repeating since variable-
oriented research turned into case-oriented research, denting
anew the distinction between case- and variable-oriented ap-
proaches.
Sociology for the 1970s contains papers by John
Goldthorpe, with Catriona Llewellyn and Clive Payne, pre-
senting findings on class mobility for a random sample of
12,000 British men in 1978. These men were visited at their
home by trained interviewers from a specialized commer-
cial agency, a by then established method of data collection.
Since many hypotheses were adduced and scores of odds ra-
tios were computed, these studies were variable-oriented.
Yet all men studied lived in one country, and Goldthorpe,
with Robert Erikson and Lucienne Portocarero, published
around 1980 in The British Journal of Sociology on class
mobility in Britain, France and Sweden. These papers recy-
cled the 1972 data by turning 12,000 men into one case, and
added to that case two others. According to Advances and
Blunders variables became cases.
In 1987b Erikson & Goldthorpe (1987a) European Socio-
logical Review published papers by Erikson and Goldthorpe
on class mobility, adding nine industrial nations to the pre-
vious three. These papers contribute to what Advances and
Blunders calls “variabilization”, not at the level of men de-
scribed by their origin and destination, but at the level of
countries. The question in wait is to what extent govern-
ment by social democratic parties makes for more mobility,
and, if so, how: by full-employment policies, or easy ac-
cess to higher education for poorer people? Advances and
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Blunders added that it is misleading to say that at first men
were studied, and then countries. According to the nerds
originally men-in-one-society were cases, and later men-in-
several-societies.
Seventh effect: sociology’s questions will be about
human societies
Finally, by 2106 digitalization had spread so much the rule
that sociology’s questions should be about societies in the
plural, that this adage had become a no-brainer. In contrast,
2016 sociology journals contain lots of papers on data about
one society only. These findings may later figure in coun-
try comparisons, but a review of papers from 20 years ago,
shows that most did not. And findings for one country at t1
were rarely compared to those for it at t2.
The turn between 2016 and 2106 in sociology from one-
country questions to questions about similarities and differ-
ences between countries and years is not a matter of ‘’If peo-
ple can do something, they will do it”. Sociology raised ques-
tions about societies in the plural from its inception. With its
focus on societies, +90 sociology resembles -90 sociology.
I now invoke two 1926 sociologists. One of them was the
first to be appointed to the then only chair for sociology in
Europe. That chair was at the London School of Economics,
and the Finn Edvard Westermarck took it up in 1907. His
History of Human Marriage from 1891 is down and out now,
and so is The Origin of the Inequality of the Social Classes
from 1938 by his pupil Gunnar Landtman. Both sociologists
were eager to take as their cases all pre-industrial societies
on earth, read field work reports, collected quotes on bride
prices, slavery, etc., and piled quote upon quote in long chap-
ters on one such topic. The number of quotes is staggering.
Why Westermarck slid away in sociology’s history has
been a topic of discussion. In my view, he did not lose un-
fairly to Émile Durkheim. Westermarck was a part-time pro-
fessor, the rest of the year the chair was held by the Briton
Leonard T. Hobhouse. In 1915 Hobhouse, G. C. Wheeler
and M. Ginsberg (hereafter, HWG) published on Social In-
stitutions of the Simpler Peoples. That book applied better
methods, turning quotes into tables. An assembly of field
work reports by ethnographers yielded a list of 644 societies.
These societies were classified after their subsistence tech-
nology, and for each society it was determined whether mar-
riages were monogamous, occasionally polygamous, gener-
ally polygamous, whether slavery was present or not, and so
on. This reduced chapters in Westermarck’s books to tables,
and made for quantitative findings.
Figure 1 contains HWG’s typology of societies after sub-
sistence technology, and Figure 2 their table on monogamy
and polygamy after technology. The strategy for obtaining
food in societies living by what HWG called hunting, was
hunting and gathering, with the lower hunters obtaining more
food from gathering, and the higher hunters more from hunt-
ing. Agriculturalists cleared the soil and planted or sowed
cereals and vegetables, in agriculture 1 hunting and gather-
ing was practiced a lot, in agriculture 2 most members of
a society lived from working the soil, and in agriculture 3
they did so with plows. Pastoralists herd cattle, in pastoral-
ism 1 agriculture is important, in pastoralism 2 herding is the
main activity. Westermarck never applied such a distinction
consistently. According to Figure 2, polygamy was most fre-
quent for pastoralists, and least for hunters and gatherers.
HWG’s tables contain errors galore, but that comment
misses out on the massive move from Westermarck to Hob-
house. Citations became instances of societies, to which
scores on variables were assigned, and two variables were
cross-classified. In 1957 HWG was outdone by George P.
Murdock’s Ethnographic Atlas. Figure 3 is from Gerhard
Lenski’s 2005 Ecological-Evolutionary Theory, provides an
updated taxonomy of societies after subsistence technology,
and embodies a proposition about environmental effects on
sustenance. Figure 4 is from Lenski’s 2015 Human Soci-
eties, uses Murdock’s Atlas, and replaces Landtman‘s slavery
chapter.
Sociology’s overarching
questions from 2016 to 2106
My reading of recent sociology textbooks and journals,
makes me venture that order, inequality and change are can-
didates for sociology’s big problems. I will show how their
extension and reformulation will steer sociology in the right
direction towards 2106.
Inequality as a master question
Inequality is the most obvious master problem. Questions
once were generated by the Weberian conceptual scheme that
classes, status groups and political parties are dimensions of
societal stratification, and lately by the neo-Weberian prin-
ciple that the economic, symbolic and political resources
of the members of a society determine their life chances,
with longevity, living standard and life styles as specific
life chances. This thesis concerns individuals-in-one-society,
and leads to an array of questions I need not spell out here.
Lenski’s societal hypothesis in Power and Privilege from
1966 was that the more unbalanced a society’s power rela-
tions are, the more advantageous life chances will be for the
more powerful. This hypothesis was specified for various
levels of subsistence technology, by stating for each level
new resources, the extent they cumulate with old ones, and
the tilt in the total power balance. By assuming that power
relations become more lopsided with technological progress,
Lenski predicted that technological progress increases in-
equalities.
Lenski’s findings showed that standard of living differ-
ences were smaller in industrial than in agrarian societies.
By postulating new, democratic, ideologies, Lenski solves
that puzzle, also predicting smaller income disparities when
social-democratic parties gain power. Soon after that, quan-
titative macro-sociologists showed as much. Two new re-
sources of industrial societies, the universal right to vote and
widespread professional knowledge, only to some extent cu-
mulate with another new resource, ownership of machinery
in the form of stocks.
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Figure 1. Modes of subsistence technology according to Hobhouse (1915).
Figure 2. The relationship according to Hobhouse (1915) in pre-industrial societies between subsistence technology and the frequency of
monogamy or polygamy.
In 2016 Lenski’s puzzle solution sounds naïve: economic
and political resources cumulate to an at least considerable
extent. In future decades a prime inequality question will be
to what extent and under which conditions democratic high-
tech states will turn into plutocracies (the United States since
the Bush family?), and into kleptocracies (like Russia now),
once more with high income disparities. Another important
question for the coming decades is also about the cumulation
of economic with political resources: why did in European
societies after World War II class-based voting decline, why
did a green left emerge next to the old left, and why did in
the 21st century the decent right lose out to the white right?
Cohesion as a master question
Since Thomas Hobbes there is the problem of violence,
named by Talcott Parsons as that of order. The first research
sociologists narrowed it into the question of who trespasses
laws protecting life and property. Here we find, depending
upon the law being broken and the persons doing so, stud-
ies on juvenile delinquency, white collar crimes, race riots,
and lynching. Of late the question of who gets victimized
became prominent. Digitalization will make questions of
who murdered whom, as regards sex and country of birth,
doable. In future decades questions of violence/order also
will be posed as questions of groups against hallmarks of
other groups. Arson in synagogues during the Pogrom Night
in Nazi-Germany will become a textbook topic, with follow-
ups in classes on questions about ongoing attacks in Europe
on mosques, as well as on housing for persons fleeing from
violence outside Europe.
Since Durkheim, the question of violence/order is only
half the problem of (dis)cohesion. He intuited that the mem-
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Figure 3. Modes of subsistence technology and environmental influences on them according to Lenski (2005).
Figure 4. The relationship according to Lenski (2015) in pre-industrial societies between subsistence technology and the frequency of
hereditary slavery and any form of slavery.
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bers of a society without violence may form a heap of sand.
Two of his books involve non-violent relations: economic
links generated by the division of labor, and ties forged at re-
ligious gatherings. Durkheim also studied questions of sex-
ual bonding: marriage, divorce, parenthood and adoption.
His suicide question is about cutting the last connection peo-
ple have with society: merely living among others. In future
decades sociology will study other forms of extreme isola-
tion, like the number of persons found in their house after
dying weeks ago without neighbors noticing, and the number
of burials and cremations without anyone attending. Digi-
talization will make such time series available for European
capitals. So, the question of (dis)cohesion comprises an array
of questions too.
An important (dis)cohesion topic for the coming decades
is the paradox of strong individual integration and weak so-
cietal cohesion. If all members of a society have strong ties
with some other members, and if like links up with like,
the cohesion of this society as a whole is weak. In 2000,
Robert Putnam depicted trends in the United States, but did
not state what went on in this society before people started
Bowling alone. Since separate black bowling clubs existed,
Americans once were Bowling apart. Putnam covered up
the paradox of strong integration and weak cohesion with
the concepts of bonding and bridging capital. In the coming
decades the paradox will enter into sociology textbooks, and
research papers will be published on flare-ups of violence in
segmented high-tech societies.
Rationalization as a master question
Weber in 1920 formulated an overarching question about
changes in Western societies involving neither inequality nor
cohesion: why did in the West rationalization processes in
fields like science, economy and polity, proceed further than
in China and India? In coming decades the question of ratio-
nalization will be separated from those of inequality and co-
hesion, with the argument that whereas the last two questions
are about persons-in-societies, the first involves persons-in-
institutions-in-societies. A list of Western institutions will in-
clude: universities with observatories and laboratories, pro-
fessional police and standing armies, as well as banks, stock
exchanges and limited liability companies. Weber assumed
that these institutions were more effective and efficient than
their predecessors, and in coming decades a flourishing soci-
ology of formal organizations will test so.
In 2106 Weber’s sub-question of a trend towards formal
polities will have been recast. This will have been done with
the thesis from welfare economics that free markets fail when
it comes to negative externalities of actions by some people
for society at large, and states then step in. Weber held that
heads of states differ very much in the aims they pursue. In
the line of the Dutch sociologist Abram De Swaan’s 1988 In
care of the state, a big question will become: to what extent
do democratic states dampen negative effects of some peo-
ple’s acts, limit collective nuisances, and further the produc-
tion of collective goods? Specific research questions will be
generated by lists of public bads and laws. Three examples:
a) to what degree do police lower crime and increase general
safety?, b) how did towns come to provide piped water and
sewers, and to what extent did this eliminate contagious dis-
eases?, and c) how did in country A at t1 laws laying down
unemployment benefits come about, and to what extent did
they lower poverty? Are you reminded of global warming
and Paris? If you do, you get how an extension of Weber’s
problem structure generates questions.
Sociology’s multilayered theories
from 2016 to 2106
After a review of how sociology’s three big questions will
unfold until 2106, now two messages about sociology’s the-
ories in this period.
First, it will take several decades before referees and edi-
tors of sociology journals appreciate how many layers seem-
ingly simply statements consist, and how much information
they convey. As a consequence, papers on some sub-problem
applying a multilayered theory, may be rejected by general
journals as they deal with a minor question only, while spe-
cific journals may refuse them because of too much theory.
Take the proposition that people live up to group norms, part
of old structural functionalism and contemporary cultural so-
ciology. Its layers are recognized if it is phrased as: all in-
habitants of whatever society, to some extent live up to any
norm of any of the groups they belong to, and this extent
will be higher if they are more strongly tied, in whatever
way, to these groups. This hypothesis explains that Catholics
less likely die of suicide than Protestants, manual workers
from districts with a higher percent of manual workers more
likely vote for the left, and juveniles more strongly attached
to their parents less likely commit petty crimes. Now guess
the publication chances of research applying this hypothe-
sis to the question of which factors explain that secondary
school pupils in a sizeable city of some European country
decline to sit in class next to a gay or lesbian pupil. The the-
oretically generated list of factors includes: what others in
their class hold of same-sex love, the percent of non-western
migrants in their school, their membership of a sport club,
parental (dis)approval of homosexuality, and the vote in their
neighborhood for Christian parties. The authors of such a
paper likely will feel misjudged.
My second post. Westermarck’s History of human mar-
riage commenced with two pages by Alfred Russell Wallace,
the first biologist to propose that new species arise through
natural selection under environmental pressures. The appli-
cation of this hypothesis to human beings by Westermarck
and others got known as Social Darwinism. For reasons I
need not state here, it went out after World War II. All the
same, for some time now, evolutionary biology has been
staging a comeback in sociology. An early bird was Lenski,
and ecological evolutionism will be a major theory in 2106
sociology. Long before, misgivings about it will have evapo-
rated.
To begin with, evolutionary biology holds that struggles
for life lead to equilibria between species, and a recent hy-
pothesis says that diversity of species furthers the reproduc-
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tive success of all species taken together. I leave it up to you
whether this effect of biodiversity, provides a good justifi-
cation for ethnic diversity as a goal in contemporary human
polities. But this showing up of a proposition from evolution-
ary biology in politics learns that links between biological
evolutionism and particular kinds of politics are not logically
necessary.
Secondly, there are variants of evolutionary biology. For
many 2016 sociologists evolutionary explanations imply a
hunt for genetic factors. However, for contemporary evolu-
tionary biologists like Richard Dawkins the ultimate causes
are environmental. Species emerge through plate tectonics,
impact of meteorites, and volcano eruptions, and what not.
Human societies become more complex with the invention
of more efficient subsistence technologies, and retrogress in
the wake of overexploitation of habitats, like overfishing and
depleted oil wells.
Thirdly, 2016 inequality sociology tends to reject evolu-
tionary biology, since it would bring in IQ as a genetic all
important factor. However, even if people inherit their IQ,
the more mating approaches randomness, the less dispersion
in the distribution of IQ scores in the next generation. Other
hypotheses about social factors affecting IQ are: under strict
abortion laws the Zika-virus has more impact, lead in piped
water - rising in U.S. cities - lowers IQ, and women above
the age of 40 more likely bear a child having Down’s syn-
drome, with a rising percent of births after that age in high-
tech societies. Finally, limited supply of oxygen to the brain
during childbirth lowers IQ and a society’s rate of births with
complications varies with its health care system. In 2106 this
list of societal influences on IQ distributions will not only
be longer and more systematic, it also will be well-known
among inequality sociologists.
The move of evolutionary biology to sociology is driven
by the proposition that differences between human popula-
tions are to be explained by the same factors that account for
the diversity of species, to wit environmental factors. Wal-
lace proposed it in 1864, adding that environmental changes
rarely change the genetic composition of human societies,
and mainly make for temporary storage of new thoughts in
human brains, with these thoughts being called by Dawkins
memes. This hypothesis provides a bridge to present day cul-
tural sociology, and it will contribute in three ways to existing
theories.
First, Peter Hedström dissected the social, and according
to analytical sociology’s principles, the elements of societies
are individuals. Ecological evolutionism analyses in opposite
direction: human societies are instances of animal societies,
and human societies at higher levels of subsistence technol-
ogy involve more institutions, with the balance between nat-
ural and collective actors in high-tech societies shifting to-
wards the latter. It is a matter for animal ethology, which in-
stitutions societies of close relatives of humans have, if any,
and how they differ from the limited number of institutions
in societies of hunting and gathering humans.
Second, ecological evolutionism harbors the hypothesis
that people do not logically derive ideas from observations,
at best throw out ideas that do not square with them, and
obtain ideas about the unknown by analogies with the famil-
iar. In this it differs from rational action theories. These
theories assume that people think up ideas by random vari-
ation. The ancient analogy thesis surfaced in 2003 in The
God Delusion by Dawkins. Since natural selection works
against waste, Dawkins found it puzzling that people spend
time and energy on religion. To solve this difficulty, Dawkins
replaced the question of religion’s survival value by that of
whether religion is a by-product of something else. His thesis
was that natural selection wired children to follow educators,
with as a by-product acceptance of anthropomorphic ideas
on the world’s origin. Since newborns survive by the actions
of their caretakers, they will as adults believe in benevolent
creators. Research on origin stories from pre-industrial so-
cieties confirms this. In coming decades questions will be
raised on analogical reasoning in high-tech societies. Under
which conditions do their politicians skip data on legislative
effects and ridicule opponents with analogies, and in which
settings do even academics use analogies rather than general
principles to answer concrete questions?
Finally, ecological evolutionism has hypotheses about ef-
fects of natural environments on subsistence technologies.
One is about industrial societies, in particular high-tech so-
cieties. Their per capita energy consumption is much higher
than that of agrarian and other pre-industrial societies, and
industrial energy until now mainly came from fossil fuels.
At first this fuel was coal, giving a head start to England and
Belgium, later it became oil. Like coal, oil is unequally dis-
tributed across the world, and that is partly why per capita in-
come now is higher in some parts of the world. Oil wells dry
up before 2106, or phased out because of hydrocarbon emis-
sion, and new sources of energy will be unequally distributed
across the world. Sweden generates hydropower, other coun-
tries will be unable to do so. Solar power will expand before
2106, but several high tech countries will have to import it.
And it is a windmill that every country without hydropower
or solar power, will get by 2106 the energy it now guzzles
from windmills. So the ranking of the world’s countries af-
ter per capita income will change, and in slipping countries
cohesion falls and income disparities increase. I hope young
sociologists in my audience will devise detailed hypotheses
on effects of the worldwide redistribution of energy resources
for societal inequality and cohesion.
The five-year PAESR award:
2021 to 2106
There is no Nobel Prize for sociology right now, there will
be not be one in 2106, and that for Economics was scrapped
in the meantime. In 2021 the first Award for Preserva-
tion and Alteration in European Sociological Research was
handed out, and then every five years. The initiative was
taken by sociologists who started in academia and made it
big in big data, and goes to research superseding some golden
oldie. Book titles give a good impression of the best type
of concrete research undertaken in sociology from now until
2106. I present them without comments, but except 2021,
2051 and 2106, which I treat last.
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Fifteen PAESR awards
2005 Peter Hedström, Dissecting the social, On the
principles of analytical sociology
2026 Human societies and other animal societies,
Principles of ecological evolutionism
1956 Pitirim Sorokin, Fads and foibles in modern
sociology
2031 Advances and blunders in the history of
sociological research
1936 Edvard Westermarck, The future of marriage
in Western civilization
2036 The future of gay marriage and straight
cohabitation in European societies
1977 Ronald Inglehart, The silent revolution,
changing values and political styles among
Western publics
2041 Violent revolutions, How in Europe the
decent right lost from the white right
1946 Karl Popper, The open society and its enemies
1984 Peter Blau, Crosscutting social circles
2046 Open societies without crosscutting social
circles
1913 Émile Durkheim, The elementary forms of
religious life
2006 Richard Dawkins, The god delusion
2056 The elementary forms of atheist life, Doing
without god delusions
1959 Ernst Topitsch, Vom Ursprung und Ende der
Metaphysik
2061 Analogical reasoning and syllogisms, How
Ph.D. holders and politicians argue in
high-tech societies
1966 Gerhard Lenski, Power and privilege, a theory
of social stratification
2066 Resources and advantages, A theory of
vicious circles, recurrent effects and
compensatory strategies
1980 James Coleman, The asymmetric society
2076 The ever more asymmetric EU and US,
How corporate actors grab you and me
1979 Helen Fein, Accounting for genocide, victims
and survivors of the holocaust
2081 Accounting for 21st century mass murders
1981 Pierre Bourdieu, La distinction, critique
social du jugement
2086 Why Bourdieu became less distinctive,
Leading sociologists falling from grace
1991 Nathalie Heinich, La gloire de Van Gogh
2091 Van Gogh’s ascent and Monet’s
decline, Time series of museum tickets
and poster sales
1994 Sara McLanahan & Gary Sandefur,
Growing up with a single parent
2096 Growing up with four parents
1993 Anthony Oberschall, Social movements,
Ideologies, interests and identities
2096 Failures and successes of ad-free
society movements
2014 Thomas Piketty, Capital in the twenty-
first century
2101 That was capital in the 21st, this will
be capital in the 22nd century
Three more awards
The first PAESR-award went against the rule that the
prize-book would follow up on one of sociology’s classics.
Its point of departure was a clipping from the Helsinki Times
of May 28, 2014, with the heading “Finland has the lowest
income inequality in the EU”, and invoked a report of Eu-
rostat. Finland dethroned argued against this finding. The
study’s questions were about the rich, the super-rich and the
hyper-rich, it stated that the published data on the income
shares of the richest 10% persons-in-households were not
accompanied by standard errors, and held that the Finnish
samples were not big enough to arrive at reliable estimates
for the richest 1% and richest 0,1%. It also pointed out that
sample sizes differed a lot from country to country (in 2007:
10,000 for Finland, 80,000 for the Netherlands, 20,000 for
Sweden, 5,000 for the United Kingdom, and 100,000 for the
United States), particularly if it is taken into account that in-
comes are not normally distributed, but skewed at the up-
per end. The sociologists behind the book laid its hands on
bigger samples for all EU-countries from tax records, with
one of its findings that income inequalities were significantly
smaller in the Netherlands than in Finland. Here is the book
title and that of the newspaper clipping:
2014 Finland has the lowest income inequality in EU
2021 Finland dethroned, When big data on income
inequality are not big enough
The prize for 2051 did not go either to a study outdo-
ing one of sociology’s classics. It argued against a study
by Becker, a winner of a Nobel-prize for economics. In A
treatise on the family Becker - unlike previous economists
and sociologists - did not regard the family as a consump-
tion unit, but as a production unit, just like firms traditionally
studied by economics. The award-winning book turned the
tables by raising questions about firms as consumption units,
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offered propositions on consumption functions of chief exec-
utive officers of corporations in the Fortune Global 500, and
estimated them with data on company jets, five-star hotels for
business trips, office furniture, number of private secretaries,
and three-martini lunches. An honorary award that year went
to research on food in the canteens of the main plants and
offices of these corporations. Here are the vignettes:
1981 Gary Becker, A treatise on the family
2051 A treatise on the firm, The CEO consumption
function
The 2106 PAESR-award invoked a paper from 1957, that
became famous as a chapter in Goffman’s Asylums from
1961. Goffman had written down observations while em-
ployed in a U.S. mental hospital, and showed that persons
who entered it lost so much control over their life, that they
became inmates of a total institution. The prize-winning
book for 2106 applied this theory to what went on around
2100 in sociology departments of European universities. At
the level of each employed person, working hours are mon-
itored by the minute, emails on a regular basis are checked
for sociological content, the number of words in publications
is counted every year, as well as the number times publi-
cations are quoted, time spent on estimating which models
with what kind of software is traced regularly, the quality
of power-points and examination questions is determined for
each semester, while records are kept of how many students
each staff member fails, and of how high or low students rate
each teacher. When changing jobs between universities, soci-
ologists have to present these materials. The main difference
found in this PAESR-award is that members of sociology de-
partments are thrown out more easily that inmates of mental
hospitals.
1957 Erving Goffman, The characteristics of total
institutions
2106 Are European sociology departments total
institutions?
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